Nuremberg document No. 064-C
Report of the Commander in Chief of the Navy to the Führer,
December 12, 1939, at Noon
Subject : The Norwegian Affair.
||Colonel General Keitel,
Major General Jodl,
Lieutenant Commander v. Puttkammer.
The Commander in Chief of the Navy received MM. Q[uisling] and H[agelin]. Q., former Minister of War and leader of the National Party, made a reliable impression. He reported the following: Public opinion in Norway is very hostile to Germany, as a result of the conflict between Russia and Finland even more so than formerly. England's influence is very great, above all through the President of the Storting, Hambro (a Jew and a friend of Hore-Belisha), who is at present all-powerful in Norway. Q. is convinced that there is an agreement between England and Norway about a possible future [eventuell] occupation of Norway. There is a very real danger that Norway may be occupied by Britain, possibly soon. Sweden would
then also turn against Germany. The Storting, and with it the Government of Norway, will no longer be legal from January 11, 1940, since it decided to extend itself for a year, contrary to the constitution.
This would provide an opportunity for a political revolution. Q. has good connections with officers in the Norwegian Army and has followers in important places (e. g., railways). Should the occasion arise, Q. is prepared to take over the government and to ask Germany for aid. In addition, Q. is ready to discuss preparations of a military nature with the German Wehrmacht.
The C.-in-C., Navy, points out that it is impossible to know with such offers how much the people concerned wish to further their own party schemes and how important German interests are to them.
Caution is therefore advisable. It must be made impossible for Norway to fall into British hands, as this could be decisive for the outcome of the war; Sweden would then be entirely under British influence
and the war would be carried into the Baltic Sea, thereby completely disrupting German naval warfare in the Atlantic and in the North Sea.
The Führer also regards the occupation of Norway by Britain as unacceptable. The C.-in-C., Navy, points out that German occupation of Norwegian coastal bases would naturally occasion strong
British countermeasures for the purpose of interrupting the transport of ore from Narvik. Severe surface warfare off the Norwegian coast would be the result, and the German Navy is not yet prepared to cope with this for any length of time. In the event of occupation, this is a weak spot.
The Führer considers whether he should speak to Q. personally, in order to form an impression of him ; he would like to hear Reichsleiter Rosenberg's opinion first, as the latter has known Q. for some time.
The C.-in-C., Navy, suggests that if the Führer is favorably impressed, the OKW be permitted to make plans with Q. for preparing and executing the occupation either : (a) by friendly methods, i. e., the German Wehrmacht is called upon by Norway; or (b) by force.
2. The C.-in-C., Navy, recommends keeping a clear policy with regard to the Russo-Finnish conflict. No armament is to be sent in support of Finland (via unreliable Sweden). The Chief of Staff,
OKW, declares that the Foreign Ministry has been informed that arms would be delivered to Sweden only if the Swedish Government guarantees in writing that they are to be used solely by the Swedish Army.
On the other hand, the C.-in-C., Navy, recommends accommodating Russia, for example in the matter of oil supply for submarines, as Russia also offers us practical advantages, e. g., holding foreign ships
in Murmansk for 3 days after the departure of the Bremen.
The Führer agrees on both points.
Source: Documents on German foreign policy 1918-1945. Series D. Volume VIII. No. 443. Washington, Department of State, publication 5436, 1954. Annotations not included.
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